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1. Introduction 
In the economic assessment of competition cases, market power is associated with the ability to 
elevate price over cost and can be analysed by reference to the Lerner index or price-cost margin, 
defined as the difference between price and marginal cost relative to price (i.e.
p
cp − , where p 
denotes price and c marginal cost).  In the Cournot model of competition, where firms are 
quantity setters, each firm’s price-cost margin is proportional to its market share while the 
market price-cost margin, given as the sum of the firms’ individual price-cost margins weighted 
by their respective market shares, is proportional to the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of market 
concentration.1  In the Bertrand model of competition, in which firms are price setters, the firm 
and market price-cost margins vary from 0 (homogeneous products) to some positive number 
(product differentiation), with margins increasing with the degree of product differentiation.  
Economic theory therefore predicts that market power will generally be higher the greater the 
level of concentration and the larger the degree of product differentiation in a relevant market, 
other things being equal.  However, the exercise of market power in practice may depend on 
other considerations, including the condition of entry and consumer buying power and, as we 
explore further in this paper, the effectiveness of competition policy.2
Since the 1950s, a large amount of empirical economic research has been undertaken (on 
both sides of the Atlantic) aimed at understanding why the price-cost margin varies across 
markets.  It is fair to say that there is no universal consensus on why different markets are 
characterised by different degrees of market power.  The level of concentration or degree of 
product differentiation does not always predict the price-cost margin and economists have not 
                                                 
 
 
1  The HHI is defined as the sum of the squares of the market shares of all firms in the relevant market and varies 
from close to 0 (perfect competition) to 10,000 (monopoly).  The squaring of market shares means that firms with 
larger market shares are given greater weight in the HHI. 
2   It is, of course, possible that the firm and market price-cost margin will be negative. 
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always been agreed on whether higher profitability reflects economic efficiency or concerted 
practices.3  In the past ten years or so, economists have come to recognise the case-specific 
nature of market power, with much of the understanding gained through working on antitrust 
cases, in tandem with lawyers. 
Only recently have economists begun to investigate the potential for national competition 
policy to influence the price-cost margin or the exercise of market power.  The scope for 
competition policy to act in this way is seen to have macroeconomic as well as microeconomic 
or market-specific benefits: by identifying and removing unnecessary impediments to 
competition in individual markets, competition policy is viewed as a spur to improving 
productivity and innovation, which are central to enhancing overall economic competitiveness.  
Recent economic research in this regard has considered whether more effective competition 
policy (in terms of design, implementation and enforcement) may serve to curtail the exercise of 
market power and reduce the price-cost margin in individual markets (controlling for other 
factors). 
This paper provides new evidence on this important issue by setting out an economic 
model accounting for why competition policy may matter in this regard and presenting 
econometric analysis suggesting that the effectiveness of competition policy has a statistically 
significant effect on the market price-cost margin.  Before describing the nature of the paper in 
more detail, we first review the recent research. 
Konings et al. (2001) studied price-cost margins in Belgium and the Netherlands during 
1992-1997 and tentatively found that the change in competition policy in the former country in 
1993 did not significantly affect price-cost margins, although margins were higher in the 
Netherlands during the period, which, according to the authors, had a less stringent competition 
policy at the time.  The tentative nature of this finding stems from the fact that the change in 
competition policy in Belgium came in the context of a former system of price regulation, which, 
the authors speculate, may have already served to discipline firms in that country and thus may 
have limited the effect of the new competition policy introduced in 1993.  Konings et al. also 
found that import competition does not lead to lower price-cost margins, in contrast to the earlier 
                                                 
 
 
3  See, for example, Schmalensee (1989) and Martin (1994). 
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studies by Levinsohn (1993), Harrison (1994), Grether (1996) and Djankov and Hoekman 
(2000), which suggest that import competition and trade liberalisation reduce price-cost margins.  
More recently, Kee and Hoekman (2007) suggest that while markets that have higher import 
exposure or larger numbers of domestic firms tend to be more competitive, the direct effect of 
competition law on competition is likely to be insignificant, even though competition law may 
have an indirect effect on domestic competition by promoting entry. 
In contrast to the studies by Konings et al. (2001) and Kee and Hoekman (2007), which 
suggest a limited role for competition policy in terms of curbing market power (captured by the 
price-cost margin), a series of earlier papers suggests a role for competition policy in enhancing 
economic performance.  These include Nickell (1996), Blundell et al. (1999) and Aghion et al. 
(2005a&b), which examine competition and innovation, and Aitken and Harrison (1999), 
Pavcnik (2002) and Javorcik (2004), which look at trade liberalisation and productivity.  The 
study by Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) assumes that product market reforms affect the rate of 
total factor productivity convergence across countries and industries, and finds that the impact of 
reforms tends to be larger for countries further behind the frontier, suggesting that policy-makers 
in such countries have an incentive to implement product market reform.  Griffith et al. (2006) 
associate the reforms carried out under the EU Single Market Programme with increased product 
market competition, as measured by lower average profitability and a subsequent increase in 
innovation intensity and productivity growth for manufacturing sectors in the countries 
considered. 
The empirical assessment of the relationship between the effectiveness of competition 
policy and the market price-cost margin in this paper is carried out through econometric analysis 
of panel data comprising 19 markets in the same number of countries during 1999-2003.  We 
incorporate a novel measure of the effectiveness of a country’s competition policy using a data 
source that, to be the best of our knowledge, has not been used for this purpose until now.  The 
measure in question is obtained from Global Competition Review (‘GCR’), an international 
publication aimed at national competition authorities (NCAs), competition lawyers, economists, 
businesses and others with an interest in competition law and policy.  Since 1999, GCR has 
published an annual independent survey-based assessment of NCAs – to the best of our 
knowledge, the most detailed and comprehensive of its kind in the world – which rates the 
institutions on a scale of 1 to 5 on the basis of a number of criteria, including cartel enforcement, 
4 
merger review, competition advocacy and economic expertise (reflecting the emphasis now put 
on economic analysis in the application of competition law and policy).  Of particular interest in 
this paper is whether more effective competition policy, as captured by the GCR scores, is 
associated with lower market power, controlling for other factors believed to influence the 
market price-cost margin (including market growth, import penetration and spare capacity). 
In contrast to Konings et al. (2001) and Kee and Hoekman (2007), our results suggest 
that more effective competition policy is associated with lower price-cost margins, which in turn 
points to a potentially important role for competition policy in curbing market power.  Our 
findings, which are econometrically robust, should be of particular interest to NCAs, regulators 
and other professional practitioners in the burgeoning field of competition policy. 
The structure of the paper is as follows.  The next section outlines the hypotheses to be 
tested.  Section 3 describes the data in more detail and Section 4 presents the empirical results.  
Finally, Section 0 concludes and suggests avenues for further research. 
2. Economic Model and Hypothesis 
This section sets out the principal economic hypothesis to be empirically assessed in this paper, 
namely that the more effective a country’s competition policy, the lower will be the market 
price-cost margin on average, controlling for other economic factors believed to influence the 
price-cost margin, including the rate of market growth, import substitution and spare capacity. 
The outline is based on a generalised oligopoly model in which firms are quantity setters 
and the analysis incorporates a ‘coordination’ parameter that allows us to identify a potential role 
for competition policy to affect firms’ ability to coordinate their behaviour and thus the market 
price-cost margin.4  
The market comprises N firms each producing a homogeneous product the demand for 
which is given by the inverse demand function P = P(Q), where P is price and Q is market 
                                                 
 
 
4  The model is based on the oligopoly formulations due to Cowling and Waterson (1976) and Clarke and Davies 
(1982).  The predictions of the model also apply to the case where firms are price setters and to product 
differentiation. 
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output.  In particular, Q =∑ , where q
=
N
i
iq
1
i is the output of the ith firm in the market.  The market 
price elasticity of demand is given by 
Q
P
dP
dQe −=  and measures the percentage change in 
demand for the product to any given percentage change in the price of the product.5  Costs of 
firm i vary positively with its level of output (i.e. ci(qi)) and each firm chooses its output level 
simultaneously by maximising its profit. 
The profit function of firm i is given as the difference between the firm’s revenue and 
costs, namely: 
(1)  )()( iiii qcqQP −=π
Under Cournot behaviour, each firm maximises its profits under the belief that its 
competitors will not react to any change in the firm’s own output level.  Formally, this conjecture 
is represented as 0=
i
i-
dq
dQ
, where Q-i is the output level of firm i’s rivals in aggregate.  This 
belief is generally known as the ‘zero conjectural variation’ condition, where the derivative 
i
i-
dq
dQ
 is the ‘conjectural variation’ parameter of firm i.6  Under the Cournot or zero conjectural 
variation condition, the first-order condition for firm i’s profit maximisation is: 
(2) 0=− ii MCdQ
dPq+P  
In this equation, MCi is the firm’s marginal cost (given as the derivative of ci(qi) with 
respect to qi).  Upon re-arranging, we obtain the expression for firm i’s price-cost margin (li) as 
follows: 
(3) 
e
s
P
MCP
l iii =−=    
                                                 
 
 
5  Where e > 1, demand is ‘elastic’ and e < 1 demand is inelastic.  As shown below, the model predicts that the price-
cost margin will be higher the lower the elasticity of demand (i.e. the less responsive users are to changes in the 
price of the good, which may reflect switching costs or brand loyalty). 
6   Similarly, in Bertrand competition, where firms are price setters, there is a zero conjectural variation parameter in 
prices. 
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In this expression, si is firm i’s market share (i.e. Q
qi  with 0 < si ≤ 1).  According to (3), in 
Cournot equilibrium, each firm’s price-cost margin varies directly with its share of the relevant 
market (si) and inversely with the market price elasticity of demand (e).  In simple terms, a firm’s 
price-cost margin under such circumstances will be higher when its market share is larger or 
when customers are less sensitive to changes in price (e.g. due to search costs or brand loyalty).  
(Note also in equation (3) that where the firms are all of the same size, each firm’s price-cost 
margin is given as 
Ne
1  and that under monopoly (N = 1) the price-cost margin is
e
1 , the largest 
possible value the price-cost margin can take.)7
To obtain the market price-cost margin (L), we weight each firm’s individual price-cost 
margin by its market share and sum over all N firms in the market.  This yields the expression: 
(4) 
e
HHIslL
N
=i
ii == ∑
1
  
According to (4), the market price-cost margin will be higher the greater the degree of 
concentration in the market (given by the HHI) or the less sensitive customers are to changes in 
price (i.e. the lower the value of e). 
What is interesting about (4) is that it establishes a positive relationship between market 
power (given by L, the market price-cost margin) and concentration (given by HHI) even when 
firms act non-cooperatively (as is the case in Cournot equilibrium).  Therefore, (4) establishes a 
lower level for the price-cost margin when firms compete à la Cournot.  If the firms were able to 
coordinate their behaviour in some way, they would increase their price-cost margins and earn 
even higher profits compared with the non-cooperative equilibrium. 
To expand on this principle, and consequently identify the potential role for competition 
policy in conditioning the market price-cost margin (L), we may generalise the above model by 
considering a ‘conjectural elasticity’ parameter that allows for coordinated as well as competitive 
                                                 
 
 
7   On the other hand, under perfect competition, N → ∞ and the price-cost margin approaches zero. 
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behaviour in the relevant market.  The conjectural elasticity parameter of firm i (which we 
denote by αi) is given as: 
(5) 
i-
i
i
i-
i Q
q
dq
dQ
.=α  
Upon re-arrangement:  
(6) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛α=
i
i
i
i-
i-
q
dq
Q
dQ
  
What (6) says is that firm i conjectures that its rivals will proportionately match (
i-
i-
Q
dQ ) a 
given proportionate change in its own output (
i
i
q
dq ) either fully ( iα  = 1), partially (  > 0) or not 
at all (  = 0).  The latter case is equivalent to the zero conjectural variation of the Cournot 
model.  Full coordination (tacit or overt) is captured as 
iα
iα
iα  = 1 and partial coordination as 0 < iα  
< 1. 
 With the inclusion of the coordination parameter, αi, the price-cost margin of firm i (li) 
now becomes: 
(7) 
ee
sl iii i
)1( α+α−=  
 From (7), the market price-cost margin may be derived in a similar way as previously 
(i.e. by weighting each firm’s individual price-cost margin by its market share and summing over 
all N firms and now assuming αi = α for all i).  This yields the following generalised expression 
for the market price-cost margin when firms compete in quantities: 
(8) 
ee
HHIslL
N
=i
ii
α)α1(
1
+−== ∑  
 Comparing (8) with (4), the extended model nests the Cournot model as a special case.  
In particular, where firms behave according to Cournot (α = 0), (8) coincides with (4) 
(i.e.
e
HHIL = ).  Where there is full coordination of firm behaviour (tacitly or overtly), α = 1 and 
8 
(8) coincides with the monopoly price-cost margin noted earlier (i.e.
e
L 1= ).  Where there is 
partial coordination among firms (0 < α < 1), (8) says that L is a weighted average of the full 
coordination/collusive outcome and the non-coordination outcome, with the former given greater 
weight the closer the conjectural elasticity parameter (α) is to unity.  In other words, the closer α 
is to unity, the higher the market price-cost margin. 
 Of interest, therefore, are the factors that might influence the value of α and thus the 
ability of firms to coordinate their behaviour and increase their profits (whether they compete via 
quantity or price).  Possible market-specific factors may include the condition of entry (with the 
value of α tending towards unity where sunk costs and/or regulatory barriers to entry are high), 
the number of firms in the market (fewer firms making coordinated behaviour more likely), the 
extent of size differences among firms (lower size inequalities aiding coordinated behaviour) and 
idiosyncratic features of the market (e.g. the strength of trade organisations within the market).  
However, there tend to be methodological problems in terms of identifying these possible 
influences for the purpose of econometric analysis, not least in large-scale panel datasets, such as 
here.   
On the other hand, a possible factor that we can identify here is the effectiveness of 
national competition policy, specifically the effectiveness of the work of NCAs.  It is reasonable 
to posit that well-designed and consistently enforced competition policy (across antitrust, 
dominance and merger review) inputs into more efficient outcomes in markets and generally 
heightens the profile of competition policy, making it less likely that breaches of competition law 
will occur.  In terms of the economic model outlined above, more effective competition policy 
would serve to reduce the value of the coordination parameter (α) towards 0 and reduce the 
price-cost margin.  However, it is also important to account for other identifiable influences on 
the price-cost margin, such as market growth, import penetration and spare capacity.  In 
particular, even in competitive markets, it is possible for the price-cost margin to be high due to 
rapid demand growth (or cost control).  Import penetration means an expansion of the relevant 
market and this factor may decrease the level of market concentration and, other things being 
equal, the price-cost margin.  A relevant market characterised by spare capacity means that 
9 
barriers to expansion will tend to be lower, meaning less capability of firms exercising unilateral 
or coordinated market power and therefore lower price-cost margins, ceteris paribus. 
Drawing together the analysis presented, we formulate the following hypothesis to be 
empirically assessed in this paper: 
Hypothesis: More effective competition policy lessens the ability of firms in any given market 
to coordinate their behaviour and, as a result, the market price-cost margin will 
be lower, whilst controlling for other factors believed to influence the price-cost 
margin. 
In terms of our a priori expectations, we posit that the market price-cost margin will be 
lower: 
• The more effective is national competition policy (i.e. the higher a country’s GCR 
rating); 
• The faster the growth of the market; 
• The lower the degree of import penetration (as found in the previous studies cited 
above); and  
• The more capacity constrained are firms (especially those outside any 
coordinating group). 
3. Data 
Our main sources of data are the OECD STAN database, which contains a range of structural 
indicators at the level of industry sector and country, and the annual GCR surveys described 
earlier.  The latest year covered by the OECD STAN database is 2003 and that determined the 
end-date of our observation period.  Likewise, the earliest year covered by GCR is 1999 and that 
governed the start of our observation period (1999-2003).   
Our econometric analysis is based on two data samples: Sample A and Sample B.  The 
respective structures of the sample A and B panel datasets, in terms of the number of countries 
and years covered, are given in Tables A1 and Table A2 in the Appendix. 
Sample A comprises 938 observations and is used to estimate the first of two 
specifications of our econometric model comprising all explanatory variables.  As an added 
10 
check on the robustness of the results from Sample A, we also considered a parsimonious 
econometric specification consisting of those explanatory variables found to be statistically 
significant in the first specification.  Accordingly, we were able to increase the size of the sample 
in the parsimonious specification (2,027 observations).8   
The remaining dimension of our sample is the industry sector.  For each country in each 
sample, we include data on nineteen sectors.  The OECD STAN dataset provides a range of 
(sometimes overlapping) levels of sectoral aggregation.  We have used the most disaggregated 
level available, on the grounds that it constitutes the grouping of firms that most closely 
corresponds to the concept of an ‘antitrust market’ (i.e. defined according to the SSNIP or 
hypothetical monopolist test).  (However, these sectors are still relatively aggregated (i.e. two-
digit NACE).)  The list of sectors included is shown in Table A3 in the Appendix. 
Variable descriptions and summary statistics for the two samples are provided in Table 1 
and Table 2.  In Sample A, the range of the market price-cost margin variable (PCM) is -0.375 to 
0.542 and the GCR variable assumes the full range of values (1-5).  The same is true of sample 
B, where the larger sample size accommodates even greater variation in the data.  The market 
growth variable is D_PROD, the spare capacity variable is OUTGAP and the import penetration 
variable is IMPPEN.  Other factors controlled for are employment growth (D_EMP) and the 
change in the GDP deflator (D_GDPDF), which accounts for the annual change in prices during 
the period.  
                                                 
 
 
8  Sample B comprises three more countries than Sample A, namely South Korea, Mexico and Norway. 
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Table 1: Variable Descriptions, Sources and Summary Statistics for Sample A 
Variable Description Source Mean St 
Dev 
Min Max Obs 
PCM 
Price-cost margin; for 
each country/market 
= (production - 
labour compensation 
- cost of intermediate 
inputs)/production 
Analysis of 
OECD 
STAN data 
0.136 0.0909 -0.375 0.542 938 
GCR 
Index of competition 
effectiveness for each 
country (increasing 
on a scale of 1-5) 
Global 
Competition 
Review 
3.36 0.795 1 5 938 
D_PROD 
Annual % change in 
country/market 
production 
Analysis of 
OECD 
STAN data 
0.0392 0.132 -0.799 0.945 938 
D_EMP 
Annual % change in 
country/market 
employment 
Analysis of 
OECD 
STAN data 
0.201 1.44 -3.04 3.33 938 
D_GDPDF 
Annual % change in 
GDP deflator for 
each country * 100 
OECD 1.95 1.45 -1.71 5.22 938 
OUTGAP Output gap for each country/market OECD -0.0109 0.0638 -0.524 0.357 938 
IMPPEN 
Import penetration 
for each 
country/market = 
imports/(production - 
exports + imports) 
Analysis of 
OECD 
STAN data 
0.490 1.0496 -26.0 9.91 938 
 
Table 2: Variable Descriptions, Sources and Summary Statistics for Sample B 
Variable Description Source Mean St 
Dev 
Min Max Obs 
PCM 
Price-cost margin; for 
each country/market 
= (production - 
labour compensation 
- cost of intermediate 
inputs)/production 
Analysis of 
OECD 
STAN data 
0.198 0.162 -0.375 0.926 2,027 
GCR 
Index of competition 
enforcement quality 
for each country 
(increasing on a scale 
of 1-5) 
Global 
Competition 
Review 
3.28 0.843 1 5 2,027 
D_PROD 
Annual % change in 
country/market 
production 
Analysis of 
OECD 
STAN data 
0.0497 0.124 -0.799 1.73 2,027 
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The 2003 GCR ratings of 17 of the 19 countries considered in our analysis are illustrated 
in Figure 1 (neither Belgium nor Portugal were ranked in 2003).  Competition policy was judged 
to have been most effective in the US, the birthplace of antitrust.  Within Europe, the 
competition regimes in Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, Italy and France were all assessed as 
strong (GCR rating of 4 or more).  At the other end of the scale, respondents to GCR’s survey 
considered Greece to have the least effective competition regime (the rating of which fell to 1.5 
in 2003 from 2.5 in 2000). 
Figure 1: GCR Rankings in Sample of Countries 2003 
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Note: Belgium and Portugal not ranked in 2003.  France is the average of the Competition Council 
and the DGCCRF; UK is the average of the Competition Commission and the OFT; and US is the 
average of the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice (Antitrust Division). 
Source: GCR. 
 
 Although not part of the sample in this paper, it is interesting to note the GCR ratings for 
the same countries in 2006 (the latest year covered by GCR).  These are shown in Table 3.  
There is a strong correlation between the rankings in 2003 and 2006, with the leading countries 
being the US, the UK and Germany.  The latest GCR rankings describe as “elite” the top 
performing institutions, namely the UK Competition Commission and the US Federal Trade 
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Commission, and the European Commission (DG Competition), all of which received the 
maximum rating of 5 and which climbed on the previous year. 
Table 3: GCR Rankings in Sample of Countries 2003 and 2006 
Country GCR (2003) GCR (2006) 
US 4.5 4.75 
UK 4 4.5 
Germany 4.25 4 
France 4 3.75 
Japan 3 3.5 
South Korea 3 3.5 
Denmark 3.5 3.5 
Finland 3.5 3.5 
Canada 3.75 3.5 
Italy 4 3.5 
Netherlands 4 3.5 
Norway 2.75 3 
Austria 3 3 
Spain 3.5 3 
Sweden 3.5 3 
Mexico 2.75 2.5 
Greece 1.5 2 
Note and source: see Figure 1. 
 
4. Econometric Results 
Initial testing, using an OLS (ordinary least squares) fixed-effects estimator, indicated the 
presence of heteroscedasticity, so the estimates employ robust standard errors.9  In addition, we 
corrected for possible Moulton bias by allowing for standard errors clustered at the country 
level.10
Both the OLS and OLS Moulton-bias corrected estimates for sample A (938 
observations) are reported in Table 4.  Both show a well-determined econometric model, with 
92% of the variation in the price-cost margin being accounted for by differences across the 
                                                 
 
 
9  We used a modified Wald test for groupwise heteroscedasticity (Greene, 2000, p. 598).  The result was 
unequivocal: χ2 (247) = 1.0e07 (p = 0.000). 
10  This problem may arise when some explanatory variables are at a higher level of aggregation than the dependent 
variable.  See Moulton (1990).  Here, the GCR and GDP deflator variables pertain to the level of the country in the 
data, while the other variables pertain to the level of market within each country. 
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countries.  In each case, the coefficient on the GCR variable is significantly negative, providing 
empirical support for our hypothesis that more effective competition policy is associated with 
lower market price-cost margins, controlling for other influences on the price-cost margin.  The 
other variables that are statistically significant are D_PROD (positive coefficient) and OUTGAP 
(negative coefficient).  The latter implies that greater spare capacity is associated with lower 
profitability, other things being equal, which conforms to our belief that spare capacity is likely 
to operate as a mitigating factor on the exercise of unilateral market power and would make 
coordinated behaviour less likely.  The former also confirms our expectation: in this case that the 
price-cost margin is higher in more rapidly growing markets, ceteris paribus.  The import 
penetration variable (IMPPEN) is not statistically significant and the same is true of the other 
two variables (D_GDPDF and D_EMP). 
Table 4: Price-Cost Margin Panel Data Regression Results –OLS Fixed-Effects 
with and without Standard Errors Clustered by Country (Sample A) 
Variables and 
Summary 
Statistics 
OLS Fixed-Effects OLS Fixed-Effects with 
Errors Clustered by Country 
(Moulton Bias Correction) 
Dep. Variable PCMit PCMit
 Coef. Robust t-stat. Coef. Robust t-stat. 
Constant 0.148 22.3*** 0.148 17.3*** 
GCRit -0.00489 -2.23** -0.00489 -1.78* 
D_PROD it 0.0612 4.38*** 0.0612 5.24*** 
OUTGAPit -0.00222 -2.54** -0.00222 -2.02* 
D_GDPDFit 0.00121 0.90 0.00121 0.94 
D_EMPit 0.0265 0.60 0.0265 0.69 
IMPPENit 0.0000212 0.13 0.0000212 0.22 
Sample 247 country-sectors 247 country-sectors 
Observations 938 938 
Adj. R2 0.922 0.922 
Min. periods 1 1 
Avg. periods 3.8 3.8 
Max. periods 5 5 
F(6,685) 6.00 [0.000]  
F(6,15)  18.6 [0.000] 
Fraction of 
variance due to ui
0.923 0.923 
Note: t-statistics are robust, based on the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance; *, ** and 
*** denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  Numbers in brackets are p-values.  
Data sources: see Table 1 above.  
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  We next considered a parsimonious model with fewer explanatory variables (using 
sample B, 2,027 observations).  Our ‘best’ model in this regard is shown in Table 5 below, where 
as before we report both the standard FE and Moulton bias-corrected FE results.  These show a 
very well-determined model (97-98% of the variation in the price-cost margin is explained, much 
of it by fixed effects) with the GCR variable having an even stronger influence on market 
profitability (the market growth variable, D_PROD, continues to be statistically significant but 
the spare capacity variable, OUTGAP, is no longer statistically significant).  As before, import 
penetration is not significant.11
                                                 
 
 
11   The spare capacity and import penetration variables were dropped in reaching the best model reported in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Price-Cost Margin Panel Data Regression Results – Parsimonious 
Models Estimated using OLS Fixed-Effects with and without Standard Errors 
Clustered by Country (Sample B) 
Variables and 
Summary 
Statistics 
OLS Fixed-Effects OLS Fixed-Effects with 
Errors Clustered by Country 
(Moulton Bias Correction) 
Dep. variable PCMit PCMit
 Coef. Robust t-stat. Coef. Robust t-stat. 
Constant 0.214 46.91*** 0.214 36.42*** 
GCRit -0.00534 -4.24*** -0.00534 -3.14*** 
D_PROD it 0.0323 1.86* 0.0323 2.78** 
OUTGAPit     
D_GDPDFit     
D_EMPit     
IMPPENit     
Sample 592 country-sectors 592 country-sectors 
Observations 2,027 2,027 
Adj. R2 0.974 0.982 
Min. periods 1 1 
Avg. periods 3.4 3.4 
Max. periods 5 5 
F(2,1433) 17.2 [0.000]  
F(2,18)  16.9 [0.000] 
Fraction of 
variance due to ui
0.975 0.975 
Note: t-statistics are robust, based on the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance; *, ** and 
*** denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  Numbers in brackets are p-values.  
Data sources: see Table 2 above.  
 
 
Our panel data models effectively assume that the coefficients on GCR and the other 
determinants of the price-cost margin are the same across markets.  However, it is intuitively 
possible that this might not be so; for example, some markets are more prone to antitrust action 
for a range of reasons.  We therefore also estimated separate market-level (panel data) regression 
models using the full set of explanatory variables identified in our analysis.  The resulting GCR 
coefficients are shown in Table 6 below.  The results show that the GCR variable generally has a 
negative on the price-cost margin and that several markets have large and statistically significant 
GCR coefficients – radio, television and communication equipment, electrical machinery and 
apparatus nec, basic metals, motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers and textiles.  According to 
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our analysis, it is in these particular markets that the effectiveness of competition policy appears 
to have had an especially large influence on profitability across the countries in our sample 
(sample A). 
Table 6: Coefficient on GCR Variable in Market-Level PCM Regressions – 
estimated using OLS with Standard Errors Clustered by Country 
Market In descending order by 
level of significance 
 Coef. Robust t-
stat. 
Radio, television and communication equipment -0.0476 -4.59*** 
Electrical machinery and apparatus nec -0.0335 -3.61*** 
Basic metals -0.0202 -3.04*** 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers -0.0230 -2.99*** 
Textiles -0.0183 -2.97** 
Food products and beverages -0.0125 -1.76 
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel -0.0248 -1.54 
Wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur -0.0201 -1.52 
Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches 
and clocks -0.0274 -1.35 
Paper and paper products -0.0136 -1.29 
Office, accounting and computing machinery 0.0380 1.17 
Other transport equipment -0.0313 -1.05 
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded 
media 0.0108 0.52 
Rubber and plastics products -0.00263 -0.36 
Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply -0.00831 -0.26 
Chemicals and chemical products 0.00291 0.25 
Other business activities -0.00705 -0.17 
Fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment 0.00139 0.14 
Tobacco products -0.00386 -0.11 
Note: t-statistics are robust, based on the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance; *, ** and 
*** denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  Numbers in brackets are p-values.  
Data sources: see Table 1 above.  
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5. Conclusions 
Recent years have witnessed an increased focus on competition policy as a key instrument of 
economic policymaking.  In emerging economies, such as the former Soviet Bloc countries of 
Eastern Europe (many of which are now members of the EU), competition policy is identified as 
central to promoting a fair and effective enterprise economy and of fundamental importance to 
attracting mobile foreign direct investment.  In this regard, it is interesting to note China’s 
recently-introduced competition laws.  In other countries, competition policy has also become an 
important weapon against inflation – notably in the Eurozone economies, which no longer have 
the option of using domestic monetary policy to control prices.  The increased emphasis on 
competition policy across the world has seen national competition authorities (NCAs) working 
towards adopting international best practices in the design, implementation and enforcement of 
competition policy (including concerted practices, dominance abuse and merger control) – a 
development that has been aided by international networks of competition practitioners.   
Nevertheless, differences in the effectiveness of national competition policy and NCAs 
across countries remain (due to a variety of factors).  Applying panel data analysis to a unique 
source of data – the survey-based annual ratings of NCAs provided by Global Competition 
Review – this paper has found that more effective competition policy is likely to have an 
important effect in curbing the exercise of market power in markets, which serves to reinforce 
the emphasis on competition policy as an instrument of economic policy. 
While we have measured an overall effect of competition institutions on market 
outcomes, there is scope for future work to identify the main channels through which these 
institutions have their effects.  Presumably much of the benefit arises from prevention and 
deterrence of anti-competitive concerted practices (particularly cartels), but there are also likely 
to be contributions from other antitrust activities such as control of market power, competition 
advocacy and market studies, which can sometimes lead to improvements in competition in 
markets through voluntary and/or imposed remedies. 
The time dimension of competition policy also remains to be explored.  Putting 
appropriate institutions in place may have some immediate effects, but it is also likely that 
changing the behaviour of firms requires a process of education, which may take time.  For 
example, competition compliance programmes within undertakings or competition advocacy 
19 
activities by regulators may affect behaviour in gradual, but wide-ranging, ways.  With the 
advent of competition policy across the world, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) as well as 
larger businesses are becoming increasingly aware of what can and cannot be done under 
national competition rules and there appears to be much greater respect for complying with 
competition principles (on average).  If such educational effects are important, there are likely to 
be lags between changes in institutional quality and market outcomes.   
20 
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Tables for Appendix: Additional Information 
Table A1: Number of Observations per Country and Year  
(Sample A) 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
1. Austria - 19 19 19 19 
2. Belgium 17 - - - - 
3. Canada 14 14 14 - - 
4. Denmark 19 19 19 19 19 
5. Finland - 19 19 19 19 
6. France 19 19 19 19 - 
7. Germany 19 19 18 18 - 
8. Greece - 19 19 19 19 
9. Italy 16 16 16 16 3 
10. Japan - 13 13 13 13 
11. Netherlands 16 16 16 12 8 
12. Portugal 3 3 3 - - 
13. Spain - 19 17 17 - 
14. Sweden 14 14 14 14 - 
15. United 
Kingdom 3 3 3 3 3 
16. United States 18 18 18 16 16 
 
 
23 
Table A2: Number of Observations per Country and Year  
(Sample B) 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
1. Austria - 37 37 37 37 
2. Belgium 37 - - - - 
3. Canada 24 24 24 - - 
4. Denmark 37 37 37 37 37 
5. Finland - 37 37 37 37 
6. France 37 37 37 37 - 
7. Germany 37 37 35 35 - 
8. Greece - 37 37 37 37 
9. Italy 27 27 27 27 3 
10. Japan - 14 14 14 14 
11. South Korea - - - 22 22 
12. Mexico - - 21 12 12 
13. Netherlands 33 33 33 29 23 
14. Norway - - - 33 6 
15. Portugal 37 21 21 - - 
16. Spain - 37 19 19 - 
17. Sweden 22 22 22 22 - 
18. United 
Kingdom 37 37 37 37 35 
19. United States 26 26 26 24 24 
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Table A3: Sectors included in Analysis 
 Sector description NACE 
1 Radio, television and communication equipment 32 
2 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 31 
3 Basic metals 27 
4 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 34 
5 Textiles 17 
6 Food products and beverages 15 
7 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 23 
8 Wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur 18 
9 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches 
and clocks 
33 
10 Paper and paper products 21 
11 Office, accounting and computing machinery 30 
12 Other transport equipment 35 
13 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded 
media 
22 
14 Rubber and plastics products 25 
15 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 40 
16 Chemicals and chemical products 24 
17 Other business activities 74 
18 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment 
28 
19 Tobacco products 16 
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